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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
George J. Besaw, Jr., appeals from the district court's appellate opinion 
affirming Besaw's conviction for DUI with excessive breath alcohol concentration. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A state trooper stopped Besaw's vehicle for failure to signal and for failure 
to maintain lane. (R., vol. I, p. 10.) Besaw smelled strongly of alcohol and had 
bloodshot eyes. (Id.) The officer administered field sobriety tests, which Besaw 
failed. (Id.) Besaw's breath alcohol concentration ("BAC") tested at .219 percent 
and .201 percent, with one insufficient sample result. (ld.) 
The state charged Besaw with misdemeanor DUI with an excessive (over 
.20) breath alcohol concentration. (R., vol. I, pp. 7-8; 65-66.) Besaw filed a 
"Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine" (hereinafter "Motion"). (R., 
vol. I, pp. 61-63.) In the Motion, Besaw sought to exclude, under the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence, all results of field sobriety and BAC tests. (R., vol. I, pp. 62-63.) 
The magistrate court denied the Motion. (R., vol. III, pp. 407-22.) 
The matter proceeded to jury trial. (R., vol. III, pp. 423-26.) At the 
conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty. (R., vol. III, p. 438.) 
The magistrate court entered judgment and Besaw appealed to the district court. 
(R., vol. III, pp. 439, 446-48.) On appeal, the district court affirmed, specifically 
concluding there was no error in the admission at trial of the BAC or field sobriety 
testing results. (R., vol. III, pp. 639-50 (copy attached as appendix).) Besaw 
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filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's appellate decision. (R., vol. 
III, pp. 652-55.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Besaw states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the breath 
test [for alleged failure to follow standard operating 
procedures]. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the field 
sobriety test or limiting the use of field sobriety tests by the 
State. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in its failure to find a lack of 
standards in breath testing as required by the [sic] Idaho 
Code § 18-8004(4). 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Besaw failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision 
affirming the magistrate's ruling that the breath testing results were 
admissible evidence in Besaw's trial for DUI with an excessive BAC? 
2. Has Besaw failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision 
affirming the magistrate's ruling that the field sobriety testing results were 
admissible evidence in Besaw's trial for DUI? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Besaw Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of His Breath 
Test Results 
A. Introduction 
The trial court rejected Besaw's arguments and found the evidence of his 
breath alcohol tests admissible at trial. (R., vol. III, pp. 407-10, 414-21.) The 
district court affirmed. (R., vol. III, pp. 639-47.) On appeal to this Court Besaw 
claims that the courts below erred on two bases. First, he asserts that the breath 
testing instrument required performance verification with the 0.20 alcohol solution 
within 24 hours of his test to comply with the standard operating procedures. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-11.) This argument is contrary to the plain language of 
those procedures. Second, he asserts that the officer did not conduct an 
adequate observation during the 15-minute observation period prior to testing. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-18.) The record and applicable law, however, show no 
error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl 
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"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." .lit (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho at 670; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981)). 
In a DUI prosecution, whether the state has satisfied the foundational 
requirements for the admission of breath test results is a question of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 
452,988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338,339, 
882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Besaw Has Failed To Show That The Lower Courts Erred By Concluding 
That His Breath Testing Complied With Applicable Standard Operating 
Procedures 
In order to have the results of a breath test admitted as evidence at trial, 
the state must make a foundational showing that the administrative procedures 
which ensure the reliability of the test have been met. State v. Mazzuca, 132 
Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127, 
129, 867 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Ct. App. 1993)). To satisfy this foundational 
requirement, "the state may rely on I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides an 
expedient method for admitting BAC test results into evidence when the analysis 
is conducted pursuant to [Idaho State Police ("ISP")] standards." State v. Uhlry, 
121 Idaho 1020, 1022,829 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
Specifically, that statute provides: 
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the 
alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated 
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho 
5 
state police under the provIsions of approval and certification 
standards to be set by that department, or by any other method 
approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for alcohol 
concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method 
approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in a 
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a 
witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). "If the State elects to proceed under § 18-8004(4), it must not 
only show that the test equipment was approved by [ISP] but also that the 
equipment was operated and the test administered in conformity with [ISP] 
standards." State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 411, 973 P.2d 758, 763 (Ct. App. 
1999) (citing State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 39-40, 764 P.2d 113, 116-17 (Ct. App. 
1988)). 
The Standard Operating Procedures ("SOP") promulgated by the Idaho 
State Police were admitted into evidence. (Defense Exhibit 3.) "Administrative 
rules are interpreted the same way as statutes." Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. Of Tax 
Appeals, 150 Idaho 417,420, 247 P.3d 644, 647 (2011).1 The objective of 
statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State v. Pina, 149 
Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall. Inc., 139 
Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative 
1 Because Besaw does not link his diatribe about the amendments to the 
standard operating procedures to any relevant legal standards (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 31-40), the state will respond only by noting that altering the procedures was 
a perfectly legitimate exercise where trial courts had given those procedures 
unexpected interpretations or where reliable BAC testing was being suppressed 
due to minor oversights that did not actually effect the reliability of the testing. 
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intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin with 
the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 
732 (2009). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not 
construe it but simply follows the law as written. McLean v. Maverik Country 
Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain 
language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the 
Court's duty to give the statute that interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011) 
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous 
language of statute if such was "palpably absurd"). 
Application of these standards to the facts of this case shows no error by 
the trial or district court. 
1. The Standard Operating Procedures Require Monthly, Not Daily, 
Performance Verification With A 0.20 Percent Alcohol Solution 
The standard operating procedures require a performance verification 
"using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification solution" "within 24 hours, before 
or after an evidentiary test." SOP 5.1.3 (Defense Exhibit 3) (emphasis added). 
The procedures clarify that a performance verification using the 0.20 solution is 
to be done "once per calendar month." SOP 5.1.4. Although it will "satisfy" the 
24 hour testing requirement, verification with the 0.20 solution "should not be 
used routinely for this purpose." SOP 5.1.4.1. Under the plain language of the 
standard operating procedures, the 24 hour performance verifications will 
normally use the 0.08 solution and verification using the 0.20 solution is required 
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only "once per calendar month," but if the verification using the 0.20 solution was 
done within the 24 hour period of a particular test then no additional verification 
need be done. This is the plain language reading of the standard operating 
procedures given by both the magistrate (R., vol. III, pp. 417-20) and the district 
court (R., vol. III, pp. 642-47). 
Besaw argues that the rule of lenity requires the standard operating 
procedures to be read as requiring that tests over 0.20 BAC be verified with the 
0.20 solution. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.2) "The rule of lenity requires that 
ambiguous criminal statutes should be read narrowly and be construed in favor 
of the defendant." State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (citations omitted). "[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after 
considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous 
ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as 
to what [the legislature] intended." Barber v. Thomas, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 
2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The "rule does 
not require a court to disregard the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the 
context," Jones, 151 Idaho at 947,265 P.3d at 1159, and the mere "grammatical 
possibility of a defendant's interpretation does not command a resort to the rule 
of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible 
reading of the [legislative] purpose" Abbott v. U.S., _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 18, 
31 n.9 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). Besaw has failed to show any 
2 Besaw also makes several factual and legal claims refuted by the district court. 
(Compare Appellant's brief, pp. 8-11 with R., vol. III, pp. 643-47.) The state 
incorporates the district court's analysis of these issues by reference. 
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ambiguity in the standard operating procedures, much less an ambiguity rising to 
the level of requiring application of the rule of lenity. 
The standard operating procedures required a performance verification 
using the 0.20 solution within the "calendar month" and a verification using either 
the 0.08 or the 0.20 solution within 24 hours of Besaw's test. A performance 
verification using the 0.20 solution was conducted "just twelve (12) days prior to 
Defendant's testing, and a 0.08 performance verification was conducted less 
than two (2) hours after Defendant's evidentiary testing was completed." (R., vol. 
III, pp. 419-20.) Besaw has failed to show error in the determination that the 
performance verification conducted in his case complied with the standard 
operating procedures. 
2. Breath Alcohol Testing Complied With The Requirement Of A 15 
Minute Monitoring Period 
The standard operating procedures state that a suspect "should be 
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes" prior to breath testing. SOP 6.1. 
During this period the suspect "should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or 
belch/burp/vomitlregurgitate." Id. "During the monitoring period, the Operator 
must be alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of the breath 
alcohol test." SOP 6.1.4. Such events include "the presence of mouth alcohol," 
SOP 6.1.4.1, and vomiting or regurgitating "material from the stomach into the 
[suspect's] breath pathway," SOP 6.1.4.1. 
The purpose of monitoring for fifteen minutes prior to breath testing is "to 
rule out the possibility that alcohol or other substances have been introduced into 
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the subject's mouth from the outside or by belching or regurgitation." Bennett v. 
State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144, 206 P.3d 505, 508 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The "level of surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to 
accomplish that purpose." Wilkinson v. State, Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 784, 
787, 264 P.3d 680, 683 (Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). This is not an "onerous burden" and "ordinarily will be met if the officer 
stays in close physical proximity to the test subject so that the officer'S senses of 
sight, smell and hearing can be employed." Wilkinson, 151 Idaho at 787-88,264 
P.3d at 683-84 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bennett, 147 Idaho at 144, 
206 P.3d at 508). 
The magistrate found that "the officer was within two to three feet of 
Defendant Besaw, was facing him at all times, putting himself in a physical 
position that allowed him to utilize not only his sight but all his senses to 
accomplish the purpose of the monitoring period, which is to determine if a 
defendant belches, burps or vomits." (R., vol. III, p. 416.) Both the magistrate 
and the district court found this monitoring sufficient to comply with the standard 
operating procedures. (R., vol. III, pp. 414-16,646-47.) 
Besaw points out that there were several potential distractions during the 
monitoring period. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) The mere presence of potential 
distractions does not bar a finding that breath test results complied with the 
monitoring period. Wilkinson, 151 Idaho at 787-88,264 P.3d at 683-84. Besaw 
further argues that "appellate courts have routinely reversed decisions regarding 
15 minute observation periods associated with vehicles and being outside." 
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(Appellant's brief, p. 18.) He cites two cases, State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 
988 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1999), and State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 338, 144 
P.3d 40,43 (Ct. App. 2006), to support this argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-
15.) Two cases in the last thirteen years hardly constitute a "routine." More 
importantly, however, neither of these opinions (nor any other) articulated a 
different legal standard applicable to "15 minute observation periods associated 
with vehicles and being outside." Besaw's claim that there is a different standard 
applicable to his case is without merit, and the factual distinctions he points to do 
not show error by the magistrate or the district court. 
The magistrate and the district court applied the correct legal standards to 
the facts and concluded that the officer complied with the fifteen minute 
monitoring period required by the standard operating procedures. Besaw has 
failed to show error. 
II. 
Besaw Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of His Field 
Sobriety Test Results 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate concluded that evidence of Besaw's performance on field 
sobriety tests was admissible. (R., vol. III, pp. 410-14.) The district court 
affirmed on intermediate appeal. (R., vol. III, pp. 647-49.) Besaw claims the 
courts below erred. Specifically, he first asserts that the state must establish 
compliance with NHTSA standards as a prerequisite to admissibility. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 18-20.) He next argues that field sobriety tests are not scientifically 
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reliable. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-31.) Neither of these arguments has merit 
because they are contrary to established precedent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." Js:L 
The admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Crea, 
119 Idaho 352,806 P.2d 445 (1991); State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29,909 P.2d 
647 (Ct. App. 1996). Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other 
questions of admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. 
Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630,632,945 P.2d 1,3 (1997); State v. MacDonald, 131 
Idaho 367,956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Applicable Idaho Law Allows A Police Officer To Testify Regarding Field 
Sobriety Tests 
Rule 702 of the Idaho rules of Evidence provides: "If scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
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knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." "To be admissible, the expert's testimony must 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 
State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75,81,175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); 
see also I.R.E. 702. "The function of the expert is to provide testimony on 
subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and education of the 
average juror." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P .2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 
1998) (citations omitted). "An 'expert' in a court proceeding is someone 
possessing skill or knowledge beyond the competency of the average juror. 
Formal training or an advanced degree is not essential to qualify a witness as an 
expert, but practical experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a 
witness within the category of 'expert.'" State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330, 127 
P.3d 231, 234 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). 
Idaho law provides that a properly trained police officer may testify 
regarding field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. State 
v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 824-25, 892 P.2d 889, 891-92 (1995); State v. 
Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65-66, 844 P.2d 691, 694-95 (1992); State v. Garrett, 
119 Idaho 878, 880-83, 811 P.3d 488, 490-93 (1991); State v. Anderson, 130 
Idaho 765, 767-68, 947 P .2d 1013, 1015-16 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. 
Corwin, 147 Idaho 893, 896-97, 216 P.3d 651, 654-55 (Ct. App. 2009); Burrow, 
142 Idaho at 330-31, 127 P.3d at 234-35; State v. Charan, 132 Idaho 341,343, 
971 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. McCurdy, 100 Idaho 683, 686, 603 
P.2d 1017, 1020 (1979). Because it is well established that the evidence in 
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question is admissible, Besaw has failed to show error by the magistrate or 
district courts. 
Besaw argues that this precedent should be rejected in favor of the 
dissenting opinion in Garrett, 119 Idaho at 883-85, 811 P.3d at 493-95 (Johnson, 
J., dissenting), which would have required some degree of medical expertise to 
associate nystagmus with being under the influence of alcohol. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 25-26.) Besaw then advocates application of such a standard to all 
field sobriety tests. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-29.) He further contends that this 
Court should adopt the NHTSA standards for performing field sobriety tests as a 
minimum standard for admission of evidence of the results of those tests. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 29-31.) Adopting Besaw's suggested legal tests would 
necessarily involve overruling the contrary precedent cited above. Besaw has 
failed to show that this precedent "is manifestly wrong," has been "proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise," or that "overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice," and has therefore 
failed to show that overruling it would be proper. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 
43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 
655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 
P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). 
Because adoption of the legal standards advocated by Besaw would 
necessarily require overruling existing precedent on the subject, and because 
Besaw has failed to show that such precedents should be overruled, Besaw has 
failed to show that the magistrate or district court erred by following well 
14 
established precedent and ruling that the arresting officer could testify regarding 
field sobriety tests he conducted. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the appellate decision 
of the district court affirming the rulings of the trial court. 
DATED this 13th day of Novemb ,2012. 
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
CASE NO. CRll-004l9 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON APPEAL 
Tills matter is before the Court on Defendant's appeal of the magistrate court's ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. The Court heard oral 
arguments on this matter on March 8, 2012. Plaintiff State of Idaho was represented by Nez 
Perce County deputy prosecutor Justin J. Coleman. Defendant George J. Besaw was represented 
by attorney Charles M. Stroschein. The Court, having reviewed the record in the matter, having 
read the transcript of the hearing in the magistrate court and the briefs of the parties, having 
heard the oral arguments of Counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its 
decision. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Besaw was stopped by Idaho State Patrol Trooper Jeffory Talbott in the early 
morning hours of January 16,2011, after Trooper Talbott observed the Defendant fail to signal 
and fail to maintain his lane of travel while traveling on 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho. As 
Trooper Talbott talked to Besaw, he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from 
the vehicle and observed Besaw's eyes were bloodshot. After running a driver's check, Trooper 
Talbott asked Besaw to perform field sobriety evaluations. Besaw agreed and got out of his 
vehicle. Trooper Talbott checked Besaw's eyes for horizontal gaze nystagmus and had Besaw 
perform a one-leg stand evaluation and a walk-and-turn evaluation. 
Based on his observations, Trooper Talbott formed the opinion Besaw was under the 
influence of alcohoL The trooper placed Besaw under arrest and, after handcuffing him, placed 
him in the back of his patrol vehicle leaving the door open. Trooper Talbott leaned against his 
patrol vehicle next to Besaw and, facing the Defendant, read him the advisory form and observe 
him for IS-minutes before having him provide breath samples for testing. As Trooper Talbott 
observed Besaw, he programmed the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. During the 15-
minute observation period, Trooper Talbott was contacted by a Lewiston City Police officer and 
a brief conversation ensued. Trooper Talbott's attention was also briefly directed toward a 
passenger in Besaw's vehicle and to an individual who arrived to transport one of Besaw's 
passengers. 
After the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott had Besaw submit three (3) 
breath samples into the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument. The instrument tested Besaw's blood alcohol 
content and reported results of 0.219 and 0.201, with a third breath sample testing as insufficient. 
2 
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Based on the results of the breath tests, Trooper Talbott informed Besaw he was under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and Besaw was transported to the Nez Perce County jail. 
On February 4,2011, counsel for Besaw filed a Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules 
of Evidence Rule 803(24) that included a number of attachments. On February 15,2011, 
Besaw's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss andJor Suppress andJor in Limine. A hearing on the 
Motion was held on May 6, 2011, during which Trooper Talbott was called to testify. The 
magistrate court also had a large number of documents before it that had been submitted by the 
Defendant. After the parties were given the opportunity to submit post hearing briefs, the 
magistrate court entered its ruling on July 28, 2011 denying Defendant Besaw's Motion. The 
matter then went to jury trial and, on September 8, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 
Dill. 
On November 2,2011, Defendant Besaw filed a Notice of Appeal. The Defendant listed 
the following issues to be addressed on appeal: (1) whether the magistrate court abused its 
discretion by not suppressing the breath test results; (2) whether the magistrate court abused its 
discretion by admitting into evidence the field sobriety tests or by failing to limit the use of the . 
tests by the State; (3) whether the magistrate court abused its discretion when it failed to fmd a 
lack of standards in breath testing as required by I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
On appeal of a trial court's admission of evidence, the trial court will be reversed only 
upon a showing the court abused its discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74, 
829 P.2d 861, 863-64(1992). Upon an assertion that the trial court abused its discretion, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court 
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correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
On appeal, the magistrate's record is examined to determine whether there was 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law correctly flowed from those findings. State v. Stump, 146 Idaho 
857, 859, 203 P .3d 1256 (Ct.App.2009). 
ANALYSIS 
(A) DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS BREATH TESTS 
On appeal, Defendant contends the arresting officer failed to comply with the 
performance verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20 as set out in the standard operating 
procedures manual and that the officer failed to properly conduct the fifteen (15) minute 
observation period prior to conducting BAC breath testing. The magistrate court disagreed with 
the Defendant's position and denied his motion to suppress the breath test evidence. 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 provides in relevant part: 
State v. Besaw 
For purposes oftbis chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be 
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic 
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven 
(67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of 
determining the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated 
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police 
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that 
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police. 
Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw or rule of court, the results of any test 
for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by 
the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police 
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shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of 
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
I.e. § 18-8004(4). 
Evidentiary testing of blood, urine or breath done to determine the alcohol concentration 
of a driver is admissible in a judicial proceeding without the need for expert testimony so long as 
the testing was done in compliance with any method approved by the Idaho State Police. In the 
instant matter, Defendant Besaw contends Trooper Talbott failed to comply with the standard 
operating procedures ("SOP") promulgated by the Idaho State Police relevant to performance 
verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20. The Defendant contends the SOP requires a 
performance verification utilizing the 0.20 solution within 24 hours of any test with results of 
0.20 or higher. In the instant matter, Defendant Besaw's breath test results indicated he had a 
blood alcohol content ("BAC") of 0.219 and 0.206. However, the performance verification that 
was conducted within 24 hours of his testing was done utilizing a 0.08 solution. The State does 
not dispute the results of Defendant Besaw's breath tests nor does it dispute that a 0.08 solution 
was utilized for the performance verification done within 24 hours before or after Defendant 
Besaw's test. Rather, the State contends the SOP only requires a 0.20 performance verification 
once per calendar month, regardless of test results. 
The Standard Operating Procedures manual in effect at the time of Defendant Besaw's 
arrest addr€sses performance verifications on the Lifeloc-FC20 at section 5 of the manual and 
reads:] 
5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments 
IDefendant's Exhibit #3, admitted at the May 6, 2011 Motion Hearing held by the magistrate court 
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Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing 
inst:nunent is functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed 
using a wet bath simulator performance verification solution. The solution is 
provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the 
target value and acceptable range of the solutions used for the verification and 
includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of Analysis for each solution. 
Note: The ISPFS established target values may be different from those shown 
on the bottle label. 
5.1 Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument 
Performance Verification 
5.1.1 The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument 
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20 
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance 
verification solutions consist of two samples. 
5.1.3 A performance verification of the Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 
instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification solution must be 
performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be 
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered 
by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on 
the use of the 0.20 solution in this capacity. 
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with 
fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or every 
calendar month, whichever comes first. 
5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per 
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 
verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first 
NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for 
. the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 18-
8004C charge. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance 
verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at 
other levels or in charges other than 18-8004C. 
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for 
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification 
solution should not be used routinely for this purpose. 
6 
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The Lifeloc-FC20 performance verification portion of the SOP contains no language that 
supports Defendant's asserted position. The SOP recommends a performance verification using 
the 0.20 solution be performed once per calendar month and notes that the 0.20 performance 
verification was implemented to support the instruments results when a test result shows a BAC 
of 0.20 or greater in violation of I.C. § 18-8004C.2 While the SOP requires a performance 
verification be run within 24 hours of any test, it makes clear the 0.20 verification should not be 
used for this routine performance verification, i.e. the 24 hour requirement However, when the 
0.20 verification is performed in order to meet the "per calendar month" requirement, any test 
results obtained during the 24 hours before or after the monthly 0.20 performance verification 
will meet the requirements for evidentiary use. The SOP notes that failure to timely perform a 
0.20 performance verification, i.e. to perform a 0.20 verification once per calendar month, may 
invalidate test results of 0.20 or greater, but will not invalidate test results below 0.20. Nothing 
in the notation suggests that in order for a test result of 0.20 or greater to be valid, a 0.20 
performance verification must be run within 24 hours before or after the test, as asserted by 
Defendant 
Finally, the Defendant argued to the Court that the purpose of the performance 
verification is to verify a test result is accurate, not to verify that the testing instrument is 
functioning correctly. Defendant's argument runs contrary to the statement of purpose that 
precedes the performance verlfication procedures. The SOP clearly states, "Performance 
verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State Police Forensic 
Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is functioning correctly." 
2 Defendant does not dispute that a 0.20 performance verification was conducted once per calendar month during the 
time in question. 
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The court finds the SOP's are clear and unambiguous regarding the performance 
verifications to be run on the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument.3 A performance 
verification must be run within 24 hours before or after an evidentiary test, preferably utilizing 
the 0.08 solution. A performance verification using the 0.20 solution should be run once every 
calendar month and, when conducted, can also be used to meet the 24 hour requirement, 
eliminating the need to duplicate the performance verification with a 0.08 solution. The 
magistrate court found the proper procedures had been followed in regard to performance 
verifications. This Court agrees with the findings of the magistrate court. 
Defendant next contends the breath test results should have been suppressed, as the 
arresting officer did not properly conduct the fifteen minute observation period prior to breath 
testing. The magistrate court, after reviewing the video from the officer's dashboard camera, 
found the officer was at all times within two to three feet of Besaw, putting himself in a physical 
position that allowed him to utilize not only his sense of sight, but all his senses to accomplish 
the goal of the monitoring period. The trial court further found the officer's attention was not 
impeded to such a degree that his various senses were diverted from the Defendant. After 
viewing the video, this Court agrees. 
During the fifteen minute observation period, the officer at all times stayed within two to 
three feet of the Defendant and in a position where he was able to use his sense of sight, hearing, 
and smelL He at all times remained focused on the Defendant, engaged in conversation with 
3 Defendant in his briefing argues that the definition of calibration in the Lifeloc Reference Manual, found as 
Defendant's Exhibit 2 and admitted into evidence at the May 6, 2011 motion hearing, makes the logged dates of the 
most recent 0.20 performance verification "suspect". The Court finds no "suspect" language in the manual 
definition, but rather finds Defendant fails to distinguish between a password sensitive calibration that must be done 
in the lab and a performance verification which checks the accuracy of the instrument by running a test against a 
known sample. Defendant further argues that the procedural differences for breath tests done relative to a minor in 
possession/consumption investigation versus a DUI investigation makes the standards suspect. The Court declines 
Defendant's invitation to imply suspect motives to differences in procedure, as any differences are irrelevant to the 
instant matter as it does not involve a charge of minor in possession/consumption. 
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him, and the officer averted efforts by others to garner his attention. The Court in State v. 
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994) and in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 
335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006), held that an officer need not stare fixedly at a driver during the 
fifteen minute observation period, but may utilize all ofms senses to observe the driver to assure 
he does not burp, belch or vomit prior to performing breath testing. "So long as the officer is 
continually in position to use all ofms senses, not just sight, to determine that the defendant did 
not belch, burp or vomit during the observation period, the observation complies with the 
training manual instructions." State v. Stump, 146 Idaho 857, 860,203 P.3d 1256 
(Ct.App.2009). 
In the instant matter, the officer clearly remained focused on Defendant Besaw at all 
times and was in sufficient proximity to be able to use all his senses to assure no event occurred 
that might skew the test results. The Court fInds the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the breath test, as there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's fInding that as a matter oflaw, the officer complied with the 
requirements of the SOP by properly and timely performing performance verifications on the 
Lifeloc-FC20 and in conducting the fIfteen minute observation period. 
CB) FIELD SOBRlETY TESTS 
Defendant contends the magistrate court erred in allowing the officer to testify regarding 
the field sobriety tests ("FST") performed by the Defendant. In particular, the Defendant 
contends there was insufficient foundation laid, the FST's were irrelevant, and their probative 
value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, rather than provide the Court 
with facts and legal support relative to three grounds stated, the Defendant has chosen to 
challenge the reliability of the science behind fIeld sobriety testing, in particular the HGN test. 
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The issue of whether field sobriety tests are admissible as evidence at trial has been 
addressed on numerous occasions by Idaho's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The most 
challenged of the FST's is the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, or HGN. While it is the law in 
Idaho that field sobriety tests are not admissible to show a degree or level of intoxication, it has 
long been established in Idaho that the tests may be admitted as indicators of possible 
intoxication for purposes of establishing probable cause to arrest. Idaho's Supreme Court long 
ago ruled the tests scientifically sound and ruled them admissible through the testimony of a law 
enforcement officer who has been trained in conducting and evaluating the tests. See State v. 
Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991) and State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62,844 P.2d 691 
(1992). The trial court correctly analyzed the admissibility ofFST's and recognized the limits to 
be placed on testimony regarding FST's.4 
Finally, Defendant's contention that the trial court was required to conduct a Rule 702 
hearing to determine the scientific reliability ofFST's is without support in the law. Rule 702 of 
the Idaho Rules of Evidence reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." As long as a proper foundation is laid establishing an 
officer as an expert on the subject of FST' s based on his knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education, the court may allow such evidence to be presented to the jury if it is determined such 
evidence will assist the trier-of-fact. The Court finds the trial court made a reasoned analysis 
4 In briefing, the Defendant takes issue with the trial court's failure to address the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration standards regarding field sobriety tests. The Court finds no error on the part of the trial court for not 
addressing standards that are without legal effect in IdahQ other than as they have been incorporated into Idaho case 
law, statutes, rules, and regulations. The admissibility question in regard to field sobriety tests has been resolved by 
Idaho's Appellate Courts, making analysis under NHTSA standards unnecessary and irrelevant. 
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regarding FST's and correctly determined they were admissible within the limitations established 
by Idaho's Appellate Courts. 
(C) TIlE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL 
The Defendant contends the most recent revision of the SOP manual should be found by 
the Court to violate the duties given to the Idaho State Police ("ISP") in I.e. § 18-8004, wherein 
ISP is charged with the duty of promulgating standards for the administration of breath alcohol 
testing. The Defendant raised this issue with the trial court and now argues the court abused its 
discretion by failing to find the SOP revision resulted in there being essentially no standards as 
required by Idaho Code. This Court, however, concurs with the magistrate coUrt's ruling. 
The Defendant contends the revisions by Idaho State Police Forensic Services were not 
based on science, but on finding ways to eliminate challenges in court. The Defendant's 
argument relies primarily, if not solely, on interdepartmental email exchanges relative to revising 
the SOP manual. While the Court is sensitive to Defendant's concern that certain procedural 
standards were revised by eliminating mandatory language such as 'must', and replacing it with 
non-mandatory language such as 'should', the Court is unable to find such changes problematic 
without evidence that it reduces the scientific reliability of test results. 
Like all technology, breath testing is ever evolving and hopefully improving. While the 
trial court and this Court have been presented with no evidence that the revisions are the result of 
improved technology, neither has any evidence been presented indicating the changes reduce the 
reliability oftest results obtained with the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. The role of 
the courts is not to dictate to ISP how they are to fulfill their statutory duties, nor has the 
Defendant presented any authority that would allow the Court to do so. For this Court to say 
there are no standards merely because revisions have been made to some, but not all, portions of 
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the SOP manual, without evidence that the changes negatively affect test results, would work an 
absurdity. Therefore, the Court declines the invitation to second guess Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services. 
ORDER 
The ruling of the magistrate court denying Defendant Besaw's Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Suppress and/or in Limine is hereby AFFIRMED. 
Dated this .".5 
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